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Abstract
The recent ￿nancial crisis has highlighted the limits of the "originate to distribute" model
of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I
build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmstr￿m and Tirole [28] and Parlour and
Plantin [39]) and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit
risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank
balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets
allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the e⁄ect of productivity and other macroeconomic
shocks on output and in￿ ation. By o⁄ering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing
bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more
risk.
Keywords: credit risk transfer, dual moral hazard, monetary policy, liquidity, welfare.
JEL classi￿cation: E3, E5, G3 .5
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Non Technical Summary 
The 2007-2009 crisis has shown that banking and financial structures can at times interact with 
macroeconomic conditions and policies (with monetary policy in particular) in ways that 
generate significant and even disruptive systemic instability. One major source of risk lies in a 
banking sector that relies heavily on credit risk transfer mechanisms, that weaken its 
commitment to monitor clients (as discussed, eg, by Rajan [41]).  
Existing macro-models are not well equipped to capture these phenomena. Conversely, the 
banking and corporate finance literature has extensively analyzed the incentives and pricing 
mechanisms of credit risk transfer markets in a micro-framework, but has not explored the link 
with the macro-economy. Given the spreading of securitization in the last two decades and 
considering that the interplay between financial micro-structures and macro factors played a 
crucial role in the chain of events that led to the crisis, it seems important to include them 
explicitly in current models used for macro and monetary policy design.  
The focus of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at creating a bridge between the macro ad the 
finance literature by embedding a micro-founded "Originate to Distribute" (OTD) model of 
banking into a standard macro framework. Second, it aims at analyzing the macroeconomic 
impact of financial market dis-functionalities, such as those stemming from the moral hazard 
problems associated with loan sales, particularly as those lead banks to take up too much risk. 
The starting point is a standard DSGE model in the New Keynesian tradition. I introduce banks 
following Holmstrom and Tirole [28] and secondary markets as in Parlour and Plantin [39]. In 
the model I assume that banks are subject to liquidity shocks and may therefore wish to sell loan 
claims on unfinished projects in secondary markets. Both the origination and the selling activity 
are subject to moral hazard problems. Firms, after obtaining loans from the bank, might choose 
to exert low effort, hence undermining the success of a project if not monitored properly. By 
monitoring, banks acquire private information about firms’ projects that cannot be passed on to 
other investors (banks are hence "informed investors"). This leads to a second moral hazard 
problem between depositors ("uninformed investors") and banks; this problem becomes more 
severe when the bank has the possibility of selling loans into secondary market. The model 6
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implies that the bank is inclined to offer the loan on the secondary market in the case of a 
liquidity shock or of it knows that the loan is non-performing. In presence of asymmetric 
information between sellers and buyers in the secondary market a pooling price emerges, that 
reduces the banks’ incentive to monitor. In this context bank capital ratios are obtained as a 
solution to the third party contract that characterizes the abovementioned dual moral hazard 
problem. The possibility of capital recycling (loan sale on secondary markets) affects the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the bank. 
The focus of the quantitative analysis is twofold. On the one side, we aim at exploring the 
transmission of various shocks (productivity, demand, monetary policy, asset price and liquidity 
shocks) into both, the model with and without secondary markets. Second, the efficiency of the 
credit risk transfer practice is tested by comparing the dynamic of investment and other macro 
variables in the models with and without secondary markets. 
The main results are as follows. First, both with and without secondary markets, productivity  
and monetary policy shocks induce pro-cyclical bank capital ratios (capital ratios decline when 
output rises), while government expenditure shocks induce counter-cyclical bank capital ratios. 
An increase in productivity or an expansionary monetary policy, by raising asset prices, tend to 
reduce the severity of the moral hazard problem between banks and uninformed investors, as it is 
easier to meet the incentive compatibility constraints for both the bank and the entrepreneur.  In 
this case, bank capital ratios, that act as a discipline device for the moral hazard problem, 
decrease. An increase in government spending, instead, by crowding out investment, implies a 
fall in asset price, which strengthens the moral hazard problems and requires higher capital 
ratios. Second, a comparison between the two models shows that the presence of secondary loan 
markets tends to amplify the dynamic of macro variables, particularly the financial ones. This is 
because secondary markets offer a possibility of capital recycling that reduces the incentives of 
the bank to monitor and allows them to take up more risk. Formally, the proceeds from the loan 
sale relax the incentive compatibility constraints, hence freeing up capital. As a large amount of 
liquidity is available to finance projects, the economy over-reacts to positive shocks: a form of 
exuberance arises in equilibrium. 7
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 crisis has shown that banking and ￿nancial structures can at times interact with
macroeconomic conditions and policies (with monetary policy in particular) in ways that generate
signi￿cant ￿even disruptive ￿systemic instability. In recent discussions two sources of risk have
been identi￿ed: a prolonged expansionary monetary policy (see, eg, Taylor [45]) and a banking
sector that relies heavily on credit risk transfer mechanisms, that weaken its commitment to monitor
clients (as discussed, eg, by Rajan [41]). In the decade prior to the Great Turmoil both phenomena
were in fact observed: central banks maintained exceptionally expansionary monetary conditions for
several years, while securitization and credit risk-transfer techniques expanded at an unprecedented
scale.
Existing macro-models are not well equipped to capture these phenomena. Members of the
"￿nancial accelerator" family (beginning with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [10], BGG hereafter)
typically ignore bank intermediation and model the asymmetric information problem in borrower-
lender relationships through a debt contract a￿la Gale and Hellwig [24]. Even models that explicitly
incorporate bank risk, such as Angeloni and Faia [3] or Gertler and Karadi [25]1, do not allow for
the existence of secondary credit markets. Conversely, the banking and corporate ￿nance literature
has extensively analyzed the incentives and pricing mechanisms of credit risk transfer markets in
a micro-framework (see next session for literature review), but has not explored the link between
these elements and the macro-economy. Since the interplay between ￿nancial micro-structures and
macro factors played a crucial role in the chain of events that led to the crisis, it seems important
to include them explicitly in current models used for macro and monetary policy design. This
can help us not only to think about macro-policies, but also to study prudential measures of a
structural nature, that can make the ￿nancial system more resilient.
The focus of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at creating a bridge between the macro a d the
￿nance literature by embedding a micro-founded "Originate to Distribute" (OTD) model of banking
into a standard macro framework. This will help to analyze the interplay between the monetary
transmission mechanism and the market for credit risk transfer. Second, it aims at analyzing
the macroeconomic impact of some of the dis-functionalities referred to above, particularly those
1See also Chen [14] and Meh and Moran [32].
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shocks tend to strengthen the moral hazard problem between banks and uninformed investors,
hence they require higher market discipline in the form of higher capital ratios. The opposite is
true for the ￿scal shock. Second, a comparison between the two models shows that the presence of
secondary loan markets tends to amplify the dynamic of macro variables, particularly the ￿nancial
ones. This is because secondary markets o⁄er a possibility of capital recycling that reduces the
incentives of the bank to monitor and allows to take up more risk.
Section 2 provides an excursus of the ￿nance literature on the pros and cons of the OTD model
of banking. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 shows the quantitative implications of the
model in terms of transmission of shocks and monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Micro-foundations from the Banking and Corporate Finance
Literature
The OTD model of banking spread quickly in the decade prior to the crisis, bringing several advan-
tages, including better risk sharing possibilities for lenders and lower cost of capital and increased
availability of funds for borrowers. However, over time several dis-functionalities emerged. As noted
by Brunnermeier [11] and Ashcraft and Schuermann [5] some features of the credit risk transfer
mechanism can impair market functioning in times of strain. Among them are incentive problems
associated with trading in asset-backed securities, asymmetric information in secondary markets,
increased level of complexity of the ￿nancial instruments involved and the related evaluation dif-
￿culties. Concerns about the progressive involvement of banks in credit risk transfer - loan sales
and credit derivatives - were mentioned in recent years by several policy reports (ECB [21], BIS
[7]) and academic papers (Minton et al. [33], Du¢ e [19]).
Figure 1 shows the trading values in U.S. secondary market loan sales. Two basic messages
emerge. First, there was an unprecedented surge in trading volumes especially in the pre-crisis
decade. Second, while the growth stopped at the onset of the ￿nancial turmoil, volume levels did
not decline but merely levelled-o⁄.
The surge resulted in bene￿ts from higher diversi￿cation and liquidity. Moreover, there was
also a signi￿cant expansion in trading of risk of un-rated borrowers, who typically need bank
monitoring (FitchRatings [22]). Though this tendency was politically welcome in some countries,10
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build models with a dual moral hazard problem, between banks and investors on the one side and
between banks and borrowers on the other side. In most cases such dual moral hazard follows the
lines indicated in Holmstr￿m and Tirole [28]. Most of the analyses conclude that while markets
for credit risk transfer improve risk-sharing increase liquidity, they can also result in more severe
moral hazard problems between banks and uninformed investors. Empirical studies for the US have
indeed shown that lending standards declined more in areas with high securitization (see Keys et
al. [29], Dell￿ Ariccia, Igan and Laeven [16]). Whether the detrimental e⁄ects on moral hazard
prevails on the bene￿cial e⁄ects on liquidity and risk sharing on welfare grounds is a question that
cannot be answered without an explicit model.
3 The Model
The economy is populated by three type of agents: households, entrepreneurs and banks. The
latter two are ￿nitely lived: this assumption is needed to prevent that either of the two would be
able to accumulate enough resources to overcome the liquidity constraints. Production includes
three sectors: competitive ￿rms producing in the ￿nal sectors which assemble intermediate goods,
monopolistic competitive ￿rms producing in the intermediate good sectors which face adjustment
costs in changing prices a￿la Rotemberg [42] and capital producers. The latter obtain funds from
banks to ￿nance investment projects of variable scale. Banks obtain funds either through deposits
(in absence of secondary markets for credit risk transfer) or through demandable loans (in presence
of secondary markets).
The ￿nancial contract, which follows Holmstr￿m and Tirole [28] is a three party contract
subject to a dual moral hazard problem. On the one side, ￿rms can in￿ uence the probability of
success of the project which can be high, low or very low and obtain private bene￿ts in the last two
cases. To overcome such moral hazard problem two things are needed: banks￿monitoring activity
and entrepreneurial stakes (in the form of net worth) into the project. On the other side, banks￿
monitoring activity is also costly. Such costs are at the origin of a second moral hazard problem
which arises between depositors (or uninformed investors) and banks. The incentives to discipline
this second moral hazard problem are given by the amount of bank capital involved in the project.
Everything else equal, investors and depositors give more funds to well capitalized banks.12
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The treatment of the secondary market for credit risk transfer follows Parlour and Plantin
[39]. I assume that banks are subject to liquidity shocks. In absence of secondary market such
shocks induce banks to discount the proceeds from the investment activity. In presence of secondary
markets, banks can sell loans, and they will do so in two circumstances (or both): if they receive
a liquidity shock, and if they hold non-performing loans. Uninformed investors are unable to
distinguish among those two cases, hence in equilibrium a pooling price clears the market. In
equilibrium this reduces the banks incentives to monitor and reinforces the moral hazard problem
between banks and uninformed investors. Depending on the relative size of various parameters
such as the probability of non-performing loans, the size of the liquidity shock and the size of the
monitoring costs, it is possible to establish whether the presence of secondary market increases or
depresses aggregate investment.
Finally, the short term interest rate is assumed to be pegged by a central bank through a
Taylor-type rule.
4 Households
A continuum of households consume, work and invest in bank deposits and capital. Furthermore
they are the owner of the monopolistic competitive sector. They take consumption decisions to




￿t fU(Ct) ￿ V (Ht)g (1)
where Ct denotes households consumption and Ht labour hours. Their budget constraint, in
real terms, reads as follows:
Ct + qtIh
t + Dt+1 = (1 + rn





Ht + ￿t ￿ ￿t (2)
where qt denotes the price of capital, Ih
t denotes denotes capital investment done by households,
(1+rn
t ) is the gross nominal interest rate received on deposits, Dt are real deposits, rk
t is the rental
rate of capital, Kh
t is the amount of capital invested by households, Wt
Pt Ht is real labour income,
￿t are the pro￿ts that they receive from the monopolistic competitive sector and ￿t are lump sum
taxes.13
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The capital investment evolves according to:
Kh
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kh
t + Ih
t (3)
The ￿rst order conditions of the above problem read as follows:








qtu ￿ (Ct) = ￿Et
n






u ￿ (Ct) = ￿v ￿ (Ht) (6)
Equation 4 is the standard Euler conditions with respect to deposits. Equation 5 is the ￿rst
order condition with respect to capital holding. Finally, equation 6 is the ￿rst order condition with
respect to labour hours. The set of ￿rst order conditions must hold alongside with a no-Ponzi
condition on wealth.
4.1 Final good ￿rms






















￿￿1 is the aggregate price index.
4.2 Monopolistic competitive ￿rms
Each ￿rm produces the single variety i and has monopolistic power in the production of its own
variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In changing prices it faces a quadratic






￿ 1)2; where the parameter # measures the degree of nominal price rigidity.
The higher # the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. In the particular case of
# = 0; prices are ￿ exible. Each ￿rm rents ￿nished capital and assembles it with labour (supplied
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in￿ ation.3
4.3 Capital good production
Following Holmstr￿m and Tirole [28] we assume that a continuum of entrepreneurs has access to
the same technology for producing capital goods, although their returns are subject to idiosyncratic
risks, Rj: Due to the linear speci￿cation of the production function of capital goods, of the private
bene￿ts accruing to the entrepreneur and of the monitoring technology, we can specify ex-ante the
optimization problems involving entrepreneurs and banks by referring directly to the aggregate
variables. Hence we drop the index j at this stage.
Projects have a variable scale It and are ￿nanced partly with entrepreneurial net worth, NWt;
and partly with bank loans, Lt: Although all projects produce the same publicly visible returns,
they have di⁄erent probability of success. The latter is determined by the entrepreneurs. In
absence of proper incentives or outside monitoring, entrepreneurs might "shirk", i.e. reduce the
probability of success of the project in order to enjoy a private bene￿t. The moral hazard problem
is formalized by assuming that entrepreneurs can choose among three di⁄erent project outcomes.
The ￿rst project, labeled as ￿good project￿ , has a high probability of success ph and zero private
bene￿ts. The second project, labeled as ￿bad project￿ , is associated with an entrepreneur who
shirks: it has a lower probability of success, pl < ph; and provides private bene￿ts b: Finally,
the third project still delivers a probability of success pl but allows for private bene￿ts B > b:
Private bene￿ts are assumed to be proportional to the value of investment, qtIt. It is assumed
that there are two levels of shirking with the same probability of success in order to allow for a
rich characterization of monitoring, alongside with the entrepreneurs preferring the high bene￿t
project.
4.4 Banks
Banks have access to a monitoring technology which takes di⁄erent forms: inspection of ￿rms￿
balance sheet position and potential cash ￿ ow, management quality, veri￿cation that the ￿rm
conforms with ￿nancial covenants, etc.. It is assumed that monitoring can prevent the shirking
project with bene￿ts B; but not the one with bene￿ts b: This reduces the incentive to shirk, but
3Woodford [46].16
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point of view, as it makes irrelevant the exact distribution of assets among all parties. Moreover
such an assumption is particularly apt in modeling the returns of asset backed securities. Indeed, it
has been recently argued (see Adrian and Brunnermeier [1]) that failures in pricing correctly asset
backed securities and/or credit derivatives were related to the assumption, made in value at risk
pricing techniques, of lack of correlation among the underlying assets. Such correlation can indeed
increase the ampli￿cation of systemic risk, as opposed to individual bank risk.
4.5 The Financial Contract in Absence of Secondary Markets
In absence of secondary market for credit risk transfer, the bank provides ￿nance to entrepreneurs
by employing funds from depositors and its own net worth. It is possible to restrict attention to
one-period contract due to the anonymity assumption5. There is three party contract between
depositors, banks and entrepreneurs which delivers a return of zero if the project fails and a gross
return, Rt; if the project succeeds. Total project return is linearly divided between depositors,
Rh
t ;banks, Rb






t + Re (13)
Limited liability ensures that no agent earns a negative return. Since the bank monitors ￿rms,
it is assumed ex-ante that project succeed with probability ph;t: This rules out the project with
bene￿t B: The ￿rm is then left to choose between the project with bene￿t b and the one with zero
bene￿t. It is assumed that entrepreneurs have the bargaining power so that the ￿nancial contract
is designed to maximize their expected return given the participation constraint for uninformed
investors and banks and the incentive compatibility constraints for banks and entrepreneurs. The
optimization plan determines the investment scale, It; banks￿capital, BKt; funds from uninformed
investors, Dt; alongside with returns, Rh
t ;Rb





phReqtIt ￿ plReqtIt + qtItb (15)
￿
￿phRb




5See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [10] and Carlstrom and Fuerst [12].18
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the lower is the amount of capital that the banker is willing to invest in the project, since it looses
other pro￿table opportunities.
Finally, the optimal amount of deposits is determined using the participation constraint to










Equation 27 shows that the higher is the return accruing to the depositors, the higher is the
optimal amount of deposits. On the other side, the higher is the market return, the lower is the
optimal amount of deposits, as the opportunity cost is higher.




4.6 The Financial Contract with Secondary Market for Credit Risk Transfer
In presence of a market for credit risk transfer the bank has the possibility to sell a claim on
loans￿cash ￿ ows: In this respect there are possible gains from trade between the bank and outside
investors. The bank might want to sell such claims either because it has received a liquidity shock
or because it recognized the project as a bad one. A secondary market is illiquid if banks sells
only in the second case, while it is liquid when a pooling equilibrium arises. If the market is
liquid, investors know that the bank will sell either because it has received a liquidity shock, with
probability ￿ph, or because it has non performing loans, with probability pl: The pooling price in
the secondary market will be determined as follows:
r =
￿ph
1 ￿ ph + ￿ph
(28)
Notice that r < ph. If the probability of a liquidity shock, ￿; is zero the price for the claim is
also zero; investors know for sure that the bank will sell only bad loans. On the other side, when
￿ = 1 the price of the claim approaches the unconditional probability of success ph.21
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Following the calculations shown in the previous section we can also recover the optimal






























Notice that the main di⁄erence between the case with and the case without secondary markets
arises in the term that represents the rents accruing to the bank, c
qt(ph￿r):
4.7 Households Budget Constraint with Secondary Markets
In presence of secondary markets uninformed investors have an additional investment opportunity,
which consists in buying claims on loans cash ￿ ows. For this reason the households budget con-
straint needs to be emended accordingly. Let￿ s de￿ne such claims as one period discounted (real)




later. The new budget constraint read as follows:
Ct + qtIh
t + Dt+1 + rBt+1 = (1 + rn





Ht + ￿t ￿ ￿t (42)







Hence in the general equilibrium the actual price of such claims should equate the stochastic
discount factor.
4.8 Consumption and Asset Accumulation for Bankers and Entrepreneurs
We assume that both bankers and entrepreneurs are ￿nitely lived. This prevents accumulation of
savings up to the point that overcomes limited liability. We de￿ne ￿e and ￿b as the survival proba-
bilities respectively for entrepreneurs and bankers. In terms of consumption decisions both agents23
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4.9 Aggregation
Aggregate capital, Kt = Kh
t + Ke
t + Kb
t; evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + phRIt (52)
The resource constraint in this economy is given by:
Yt = Ct + Ce
t + Cb
t + It + Gt +
#
2
(￿t ￿ 1)2 + cIt (53)
where Gt is an exogenous government expenditure shocks. Since government expenditure is
￿nanced through lump sum taxation, it is not necessary to include the government budget constraint
as ￿scal policy plays a passive role.
4.10 Monetary Policy


























where mt is a monetary policy shock which follows an AR (1) process. All variables are
deviations from the target or steady state (symbols without time subscript). The steady state
value of (net) in￿ ation is set to zero. The weight ￿￿ on in￿ ation is set above 1.5 to guarantee
determinacy of the equilibrium, the weight ￿y is set to 0.5/4. Finally the weight ￿r is varied in the
simulations from 0 to 0.8.
4.11 Competitive Equilibrium







t ;Dt;NWt+1;BKt+1;(1 + rn
t );(1 + rm





that satis￿es equations 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 7, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25, , 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53,
54.
De￿nition 2. Competitive equilibrium with secondary markets. A competitive equilibrium is
an allocation
25, , 2 , 625
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that satis￿es equations 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 7, 12, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54.
4.12 The Role of Secondary Market and the Leverage Ratios
Before turning to the quantitative implications of this model it is instructive to asses the interaction
between secondary markets and the business cycle through some comparative static analyis on the
behavior of the leverage ratios and the risk premia. The leverage ratio in absence of secondary





1 + c ￿
qtph
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Lemma. The leverage ratio under secondary market is larger than the one in absence of them,








After substituting the average discount factor and the pooling price, the above condition can
be re-stated as follows:
c







By holding constant ￿rms￿net worth and banks￿capital, comparative static analysis shows
that the leverage ratio, hence shock ampli￿cation, is higher under secondary markets when:






: When the probability that the project does not succeed is large enough,
the moral hazard problem becomes more severe and the incentive for the bank to sell on sec-
ondary markets increase. In this case, shock transmission is ampli￿ed. Since more liquidity is
available, under positive shocks, the economy can exploit better the investment opportunities:
6, 3 39, 4 , 4 , 0 126
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this ampli￿es expansionary shocks. On the other side, as banks are now doing more capital
recycling, negative shocks are exacerbated by the depressed returns to investment.




￿ : When the discount factor realized in case of a liquidity shock is
small enough, banks have once again strong incentives to sell on secondary markets. They
will do so when the pooling price is high enough so that a bank, receiving a liquidity shock, is
willing to sell. As in the previous case, when more trading occurs on the secondary markets,
leverage ratios tend to be higher and the economy response to shocks tends to be ampli￿ed.
Indeed, in presence of negative shocks, higher pooling prices, increase the rents accruing to
the bank, hence amplify the banks￿moral hazard. Under positive shocks, secondary markets
allow to free up liquidity and to exploit investment opportunities.
In the short run and since the agents in this model are risk averse, large ￿ uctuations are welfare
detrimental. The larger is the di⁄erence between the leverage ratios with and without secondary
markets, the larger is the size of the inter-temporal ine¢ ciency. Such di⁄erence is indeed a wedge
which captures the worsening of the moral hazard problem under secondary markets and further
distorts the allocation of investment.
4.13 Risk Premia and E¢ ciency Wedges
Given the dual moral hazard problem and the banks￿preference for liquidity, the model is charac-
terized by the presence of a number of risk premia.
First of all, there is an external ￿nance premium which covers the costs stemming from the
combined ￿rms￿and banks￿moral hazard. The agency problems are mitigated by intermediation
and monitoring, but this requires that part of the project returns cover for those activities. The
external ￿nance premium is given by the ratios between the combined rents accruing to the en-





as the combined rents accruing to entrepreneurs and banks, we can de￿ne










Importantly, the external ￿nance premium in this model behaves countercyclically: an increase
in asset price, due for instance to a positive productivity shock or to a monetary easing, reduces27
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the premium for external ￿nance. The reason for the counter-cyclical behavior stems from the fact
that an increase in asset prices renders both, ￿rms￿and banks￿incentive compatibility constraints
less stringent, thereby mitigates the agency problems.




in this case the external ￿nance premium is counter-cyclical. In addition and, as explained in the
previous section, the external ￿nance premium (which is directly related to the leverage ratio) is
larger when r < pl. In this case, indeed, banks￿moral hazard problems are more severe and their
incentive to sell toxic assets are stronger. This implies that the required external ￿nance premium
increases.
Finally, in presence of secondary markets there is also an additional liquidity premium. Adverse
selection implies, that assets in the secondary market are sold at discounted price:
r =
￿ph
1 ￿ ph + ￿ph
< ph
In a recent paper Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [26] have measured the excess bond premium as the
size of the corporate bond spread in excess of default risk. They interpret such measure as a proxy
for the liquidity premium. Interestingly they found that during the 2007-2008 crisis such premium
had increased much more sharply than the corporate bond premia. An evidence which squares
with the implications of the present model.
4.14 Bank Capital Ratios
Bank capital in this model is optimally determined to mitigate the severity of the banks￿moral









t ) + Re
tqt(ph ￿ pl)(1 ￿ rm
t )
(60)
As we shall see later on in the dynamic simulations, the above capital adequacy ratio behaves
pro-cyclically: expansionary shocks, by increasing asset prices, relax the incentive compatibility
constraints, thereby require lower bank capital ratios. The more so, the lower is the monitoring
cost.28
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t qt(ph ￿ r)(1 ￿ rm
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(61)
To the extent that r < pl; an expansionary shock reduces bank capital ratios by more in
presence of secondary markets. The possibility of contrasting liquidity shocks through loan sales on
secondary market, reduces bank￿incentives to maintain high capital adequacy ratios. In equilibrium
this reduces the incentives of banks to monitor and steepens the moral hazard problem.
4.15 Calibration
Household preferences and production. The time unit is the quarter. The utility function of house-
holds is U(Ct;Ht) =
C1￿￿
t ￿1
1￿￿ + ￿ log(1 ￿ Ht); with ￿ = 2; as in most real business cycle literature.
The parameter ￿ is set equal to 3 and has been chosen in such a way to generate a steady-state level
of employment H ￿ 0:3. The discount factor is set to ￿ = 0:99, so that the annual real interest
rate is equal to 4%. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas, F(￿) = K￿
t (Ht)1￿￿; with ￿ = 0:3:
The quarterly aggregate capital depreciation rate ￿ is 0.025, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties is set to 6.
The parametrization of the degree of price stickiness #; is chosen as follows. In the log-linear
formulation of equation 12, the elasticity of in￿ ation to real marginal cost (normalized by the steady-
state level of output) takes the form "￿1
# : Referring to such slope allows a direct comparison with
empirical studies on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve such as Gali and Gertler [23] and Sbordone
[44] using Calvo-Yun approach. In those studies, the slope coe¢ cient of the log-linear Phillips curve
can be expressed as
(1￿^ #)(1￿￿^ #)
^ # ; where ^ # is the probability of not resetting the price in any given
period in the Calvo-Yun model. For any given values of ", which entails a choice of the steady state
level of the markup, it is possible to build a mapping between the frequency of price adjustment in
the Calvo-Yun model 1
1￿^ # and the degree of price stickiness # in the Rotemberg setup. The recent
New Keynesian literature has usually considered a frequency of price adjustment of four quarters as
realistic. Recently, Bils and Klenow [9] have argued that the observed frequency of price adjustment
in the US is higher, in the order of two quarters. As a benchmark, we parameterize 1
1￿^ # = 4, which
implies ^ # = 0:75. Given " = 6; the resulting stickiness parameter satis￿es # =
Y ^ #("￿1)
(1￿^ #)(1￿￿^ #) ￿ 30;
where Y is steady-state output.29
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5 Quantitative Properties of the Model in Absence of Secondary
Markets
In this section we examine the response of the model in absence of secondary markets to three main
shocks: productivity, government expenditure and monetary policy.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses of selected variables to a productivity shock. As it is stan-
dard in New Keynesian models, output increases while in￿ ation decreases. Due to sticky prices
employment decreases: an improvement in productivity induces ￿rms to save on labour hours. The
increase in productivity also brings about an increase in investment demand and in the return on
capital. Let￿ s now examine the banking and the ￿nancial sector. First, due to the increase in
both, the investment demand and the return from investment, both entrepreneurial net worth and
bank capital increase (though the bank capital ratio decreases marginally). As the scale of required
investment increases, both the entrepreneur and the bank increase their stake into the projects.
The increase in asset prices reduces the severity of the moral hazard problem, as it is easier to
meet the incentive compatibility constraints for both the bank and the entrepreneur. This implies
that the share of returns from the project accruing to the bank falls, while the share accruing to
the outside investors increases. Overall, banks and investment returns are negatively correlated.
The bank capital ratio decreases on impact, hence it behaves pro-cyclically, as it would do under
a Basel II-type capital requirement, but here as an endogenous result of market discipline: as the
moral hazard problem becomes less severe, capital adequacy ratios are relaxed to free up liquidity.
Figure 3 shows impulse responses to a government expenditure shock. Output increases, while
households consumption and private investment decline due to the crowding out e⁄ect. The ensuing
fall in in￿ ation triggers a fall in the nominal interest rate from the Taylor rule. This brings about
an increase in deposits, which in turn determines a fall in the amount of entrepreneurial net worth
and bank capital needed to satisfy investment demand. Overall, available funds for investment
decrease. This induces a fall in investment and in the asset price, which increases the severity of
the moral hazard problem therefore inducing an increase in the returns accruing to the bank and
a fall in the returns accruing to depositors. Contrary to the productivity shocks, capital adequacy
ratios behave counter-cyclically under this shock. This is again the result of market discipline; as
the price of capital declines it is more di¢ cult to meet the incentive compatibility constraint, hence31
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bankers must increase their stake in the project.
Figure 4 shows impulse responses of selected variables to a monetary policy tightening. As
expected, output, consumption and in￿ ation fall. The increase in the nominal interest rate reduces
the return accruing to depositors, as their outside option is less attractive. On the other side, the
ensuing fall in asset prices strengthens the moral hazard problem and increases the returns accruing
to the bank. Contractionary monetary policy reduces investment demand. The ensuing fall in asset
prices reduces the accumulation of both, entrepreneurial wealth and bank capital. Such reduction,
coupled with a more severe moral hazard problem, induces an increase in the capital adequacy
ratios, which behave pro-cyclically under this shock.
5.1 The Role of Secondary Markets
Quantifying the cost of liquidity is an essential element in judging the possible bene￿ts of secondary
markets, which allow banks to reduce the costs of capital recycling. I assume that a large liquidity
shock occurs so that the discount factor may become ￿ = 0:3: This can occur under two di⁄erent
probability levels: ￿ = 0:9 or ￿ = 0:2: In the ￿rst case the liquidity shock plays a signi￿cant role for
the dynamic, as the expected discount factor is still very low. The opposite is true in the second
case.
Figure 5 shows the e⁄ects on banks￿return and the capital ratio of a positive productivity shock
under the two parameter sets, high probability of liquidity shocks (solid line) or low probability
of shock (crossed line). A higher discount factor, which occurs when the probability of a liquidity
shock is high, reduces the expected return to the bank. A bank receiving lower rents has a larger
incentive to monitor, hence the moral hazard problem becomes relatively less severe. In absence of
secondary market, the bank must commit to maintain the resources invested in the project until
completion. Such a commitment increases the incentive for the bank to adopt proper monitoring
activities, which implicitly reduces moral hazard. As a result, the bank capital ratio falls by more
under a high probability of a liquidity shock, as this allows to free up liquidity.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 present impulse responses to the three usual shocks ￿positive produc-
tivity, expansionary ￿scal expenditure, contractionary monetary policy. In each panel the impulse
response without secondary market is plotted against that of the model with secondary market.
Under a productivity shock, the response of output, investment and in￿ ation and all other32
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macro variables is ampli￿ed in the model which allows for credit risk transfer. The exceptions are
consumption and employment. The presence of secondary markets allows to improve liquidity in
the economy. This lowers endogenously interest rates and smooths consumption and employment
over time.
Market for credit risk transfer have several e⁄ects. First, since they provide possibility for
capital recycling, they also require lower bank capital ratios as device for market discipline. Under
a positive productivity shock, capital ratios decline more than in the benchmark case. Second, the
bank can face better unexpected liquidity shocks when they occur. Hence banks￿expected returns
are higher, but react less to the shock. Higher returns to banks also imply that, on average, it is less
likely to meet the incentive compatibility constraint for the bank. This implies that in equilibrium
the bank has lower incentives to monitor and higher incentives to take up risk. As a result of this
investment, asset prices and output are signi￿cantly more volatile.
The responses to the other two shocks are consistent with the remarks just made. Note ￿rst
that, in the case of a ￿scal shock, the relatively stronger crowding out e⁄ect on investment when
secondary markets are allowed, generates a more muted output response (no ampli￿cation of output
takes place in this case), despite the lower decline in consumption. Under a monetary policy shock,
the ampli￿cation e⁄ect on output is small under the given parametrization. Investment declines
signi￿cantly more in presence of active credit markets when monetary policy is tightened, for
reasons similar to those explained, but the pro￿le of consumption is virtually identical in the two
models, hence reducing the percentage e⁄ect on output.
6 Conclusions
This paper constructs a DSGE model with banks that operate according to the originate to dis-
tribute model of banking. The model is compared with the case in which banks operate according
to the traditional "originate to hold " model to appreciate the e⁄ects on the macroeconomy of
secondary markets for credit risk transfer.
The analysis shows that the presence of secondary markets for credit risk transfer allows to free
up bank capital and tends to amplify the dynamic of all macro variables, particularly the ￿nancial
variables. In this context asset price shocks lead to ￿nancial exuberance. This is so since secondary33
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Figure 2: positive productivity shock in the model without secondary markets40
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Figure 3: expansionary government expenditure shock in the model without secondary markets41
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Figure 4: contractionary monetary policy shock in the model without secondary markets42
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Figure 5: positive productivity shock in the model without secondary markets, high versus low probability of liquidity shock43
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Figure 6: positive productivity shock, model with (dashed line) versus model without (solid line) secondary markets44
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Figure 7: expansionary government expenditure shocks, model with (dashed line) versus model without (solid line) secondary markets45
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Figure 8: contractionary monetary policy shock, model with (dashed line) versus model without (solid line) secondary markets.Working PaPer SerieS
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